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October 8, 1982 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 82-215-CFX
UNITED STATES

~rt to CA
~ Friendly,

2
Oakes, Pierce)

v.
~ . WHITING POOLS, INC. (debtor(/,:-- in-possession)

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely (w/ ext'n)

/

Whether a bankruptcy court in a Chapter 11

reorganization proceeding may compel the Government to turn over
property to the debtor-in-possession, where the Government has seized
the property by levy prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petn to
satisfy the debtor's delinquent federal tax liabilities.
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2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Resp is a corporation

involved in installing and servicing swimming pools.

During 1978 and

1979 the Government made several assessments against resp for unpaid
wi_thholding and employment taxes that it concededly owed in the amount
of approximately $92,000 plus interest. On January 14, 1981, the IRS,
acting pursuant to §6331 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
lawfully levied upon resp's "inventory, equipment, and other tangible
property."

The next day, resp filed a petn for reorganization under

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and was continued as "debtor-inpossession."

The IRS soon commenced an adversary proceeding in the

United States Bankruptcy Court, seeking a determination that the
automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy law (11

u.s.c.

(Supp. IV)

362) was inapplicable to its proposed sale of the seized property, or
that it be permitted to sell the seized property.

Resp

counterclaimed, seeking an order directing the United States to turn
over the seized property to it pursuant to §542

2

of the Bankruptcy

Code.

lFor the full text of §6331, see Pet. App., at 54a-55a.
2 §542 provides in relevant part:
~

Turnover of property to the estate.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of
this section, an entity, other than a custodian, in
possess ion, custody, or control, during the case, of
property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under
section 363 of this title • • • , shall deliver to the
trustee, and account for, such property or the value of
such property •••• "
For the full text of §363, see Pet. App., at 52a.

(
'-.__-.

- 3 The bankruptcy court (WDNY Hayes) ordered the United States

---===--==>----=--=

to deliver to resp the property under its control, subject to resp's
paying the Government $20,000 to protect its interest in the seized
property. 3

Although foreclosed from relying on §542 by an earlier

decision by the WDNY, the bankruptcy court held that the United States
was a "custodian" within the meaning of §543 of the Bankruptcy Code,
and thus was required to deliver the "property of the debtor" to the
debtor-in-possession. 4
On appeal, the DC (WDNY, Elfin) reversed.

The government is

not a "custodian" of resp's property within the meaning of §543, and
the WDNY had recently decided that §542 did not permit the bankruptcy
court to act as it had, either.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

/

The CA 2 reversed the DC.

It noted

that the question has generated a great deal of conflict among the
bankruptcy judges
also noted that

~district

t~e

courts.

See Pet. App., at la, n.l.

CA 4 had recently addressed the question and

decided that bankruptcy courts cannot order the IRS to turn over
.·. : ~··

3Although the property in resp's hands as a going concern was
valued at $162,876, expert testimony fixed its sale value at
between $35,000 and $20,000.
4 §543 (b) provides, in relevant part:
A custodian shall-(1)
deliver to the trustee any property of the
debtor transferred to such custodian, or proceeds of
such property, that is in the custodian's possession,
custody, or control on the date that such custodian
acquires knowledge of the commencement of this case.
n

It

- 4 property seized prior to the filing of a reorganization petition to
satisfy tax liabilities.
F.2d 1218 (CA4 1981).
Fo_u rth

Circu~CA

Cross Electric, Inc. v. United States, 664

"We find the issue more difficult than did the

2 said, "and, conceding the question to be a close

one, reach an opposite result."
First :the CA 2 rejected the grounds relied on by the
Bankruptcy Court in ordering the turnover.

Although §543 (b) directs

a "custodian" to "deliver to the trustee any property of the debtor
transferred to such custodian ••• ," §101 (10) defines a "custodian" as
a person who acts as "a trustee, receiver, or agent." 5

Because the

IRS is "the archetypical 'adverse claimant,' see Phelps v. United
States, 421

u.s.

330, 334 (1975) ," it is none of these.

But theCA 2 decided that §542 authorized the turnover.
__.J-

-

That section requires the turnover "of property that the trustee may
use, sell or lease under section 363 •••• "

Section 363 (c)

(1)

permits the trustee--or debtor-in-possession--to use, sell or lease
"property of the estate" in the ordinary course of business, although
§363 (e) creates a mechanism whereby an entity with an interest in the
property can seek an order limiting such use, sale or lease to the
extent necessary _to protect :_. i ts interest.

Section 541 (a)

(l)

provides that an estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable
interests of the' debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case." 6

5For the relevant portions of §101 (10), see Pet. App., at
6a, n. 3.
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages.

\
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The Government argued to CA 2--as it argues here--that the
plain meaning of these sections mandates the conclusion reached by the
~

CA4: the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a bankruptcy court to order
th~

IRS to turn over to a debtor property that the IRS had lawfully

seized--prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petn--to satisfy a tax
assessment.

The "property of the estate" that must be turned over

under §542 consists only of any interests in property belonging to the
debtor as of the time it filed its petn in bankruptcy.

At the time

this bankruptcy petn was filed, the only interests the debtor had in
the seized property were those set forth in §6331 et seq. of the IRC
(a right to notice of seizure and sale, a right to redemption prior to
sale, and a right to surplus proceeds).

Only those interests were

part of the "property of the estate," and turnover of those interests
would be inappropriate because the debtor-in-possession could not
"use, sell or lease" them.

All other interests in the property--

including the right to possession--are held by the IRS.
Although recognizing the "force" in the Government's
construction, the CA 2 disagreed.

~S

Upon reviewing the history of the

bankruptcy code and the "structure of the statute," it rejected the
Government's "mechanical" interpretation.

This was principally

because the Government's construction of the interplay between §542
and §541 (a)

(l)'s definition of "property of the estate" threatened

to deprive trustees or debtors in reorganization proceedings of the
power not only to obtain turnover of property levied upon by the IRS,
6For the relevant portions of §541, see Pet. App., at 52a54a.

J

~
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"but also that repossessed prior to bankruptcy by secured creditors or
held by pledgees after a default."

In these situations, the secured

creditor, like the IRS, typically has rightful possession of the
property and the debtor has just such rights as are provided the tax
debtor under IRC §6331 et seq.

Under the Government's theory, these

limited interests would not be turned over to the trustee or debtorin-possession, either.
This result would be "a significant departure" from
treatment of reorganization proceedings under the former bankruptcy
act.

Section 257 of Chapter X of that Act provided that the "trustee

or debtor in possession shall

have the right to immediate

possession of all property of the debtor in the possession of a
trustee under a trust deed or a mortgagee under a mortgage."
(

On the

basis of that section, and the overall structure of the old act, the
courts had conferred on the bankruptcy courts broad power to order
secured creditors in possession following the debtor's default to turn
over the collateral.

See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Kaplan, 185

F.2d 791 (CAl 1950).

To remove this power from the bankruptcy courts

would severely limit th~ chances of success in many reorganizations.
If Congress hqd set out to make so serious a change in the
. ~

bankruptcy laws, it would have explicitly said so.

Given that

principle, and Congress' clear intent to encourage reorganizations
under the new Code, the CA2 held that the turnover power recognized in
Reconstruction Finance was included in §542.

The CA 2 also relied on

the fact that §542 first appeared in the proposed new Code after

(

several witnesses had testified that the power to order the turnover
of collateral held by secured creditors was important.

- 7 An IRS levy on tangible property is "virtually
indistinguishable from the ordinary repossession and foreclosure
procedures followed by secured creditors."

It is true that under the

old bankruptcy act property held by an assignee of the debtor but
levied upon by the IRS for satisfaction of a tax lien was not subject
to the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.

u.s.

States, 421

330 (1975).

Phelps v. United

But Phelps dealt with the distinction

between summary and plenary jurisdiction under the old act, a
distinction that the new Code abolishes.

"[I]t is far from clear that

under the [new] Code a bankruptcy court would not have power to order
a turnover on the same facts as Phelps."
liquidation, not a reorganization case.

Moreover, Phelps was a
Even under the old act the

bankruptcy court had greater power over creditors, and over the
(

collateral in their possession, in reorganization than in liquidation
proceedings.

Under the old act, 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ,3.05, at 431

(14th ed. 1977), and continued in the new Code as established above,
the turnover power extends to all property in which the debtor has
title.

It is well established that when the IRS levies upon property

it does not divest title.
336-37 (1870).
337, n.S.

Bennett v. Hunter, 76

u.s.

(9 Wall.) 326,

But see United States v. Phelps, supra, 421

Therefore, the turnover power extends to this

u.s.,

at

proper ~

This result is best for everyone because, if the

~f-

~.,.z_,

I

reorganization is successful, not only is Congress' policy in the
Bankruptcy Code--emphasizing utilization of reorganization to save
businesses and jobs--fulfilled, but the IRS stands to gain repayment
of all--not just some--of the taxes owed.

(

Moreover, the Government's

substantial interest in prompt payment of taxes--particularly

- 8 -

important when, as here, the deficiency relates to amounts withheld
from the wages of employees in satisfaction of their taxes--can be
safeguarded by the protections a bankruptcy court can provide.
In light of the lapse of one year since the bankruptcy court
had dealt with the case, and possible changed circumstances, the

C~

2

remanded to the bankruptcy court to reconsider whether a turnover was
appropriate in these circumstances, and if so, what protection to
provide to the United States.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that--as CA2 admitted--this

decision squarely conflicts with the recent decision of CA4.
Moreover, as theCA 2 accurately observed, the lower federal courts
are also divided on this question.

The issue is important, and this

Court's intervention is required to ensure a uniform national rule
governing the relationship of the bankruptcy laws to the Government's
statutory authority to collect delinquent taxes.
Moreover, petr argues, as it did below, that theCA 2's
interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, which
limits the turnover power to "the property of the estate," and then
defines "the property of the estate" as including "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case."

This plain language and the House and Senate Reports

that accompanied it make clear that the debtor's interests as of the
time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy are not expanded by
the filing of the petition.
The bankruptcy code itself does not define the property
interests of the debtor: instead, these are determined by reference to
non-bankruptcy law, here the IRC.

Before the bankruptcy petition is

- 9 -

filed, an entity levied upon to satisfy delinquent taxes has rights
only to notice, to redemption by paying the amount of the tax due, and
to any surplus achieved through sale.

The filing of the bankruptcy

petition does not expand those rights into rights to turnover of the
property upon payment of bond.
Moreover, even assuming that CA2 was correct that Congress
silently "incorporated" the case law under former §257 into the new
Code, it was erroneous to extend the turnover authority to reach
property seized by pre-petition tax levy.

CA2's theory was that

Congress would not have changed prior law without explicitly stating
that it was doing so.

But this rationale does not explain this case,

because under prior law, property seized by a pre-petition tax levy
was not subject to the bankruptcy courts' turnover authority either in
liquidating bankruptcies, Phelps v. United States, supra, or in
reorganization proceedings, In re Pittsburgh Penguins Partners, 598
F.2d 1299 (CA3 1979).

The Committee that summarized the tax effects

of the proposed bankruptcy legislation did not mention that the law
would change this important and well-settled result.

The same

principle cited by the CA2, therefore--that a major change from prior
law is not to be inferred without a clear statement thereof--requires
that its decision be reversed.
5.

~

The Government makes a powerful argument

DISCUSSION:

that this case should be granted.

~

The conflict between this decision

and that of the CA 4 in Cross Electric Co. is square, as the CA 2
recognized.

The issue seems to be important, judging not only from

the number of recent lower court decisions that have confronted it,
but also from the degree to which the power to order the turnover of
....

- 10 -

property in this situation is important to successful reorganizations,
and harmful to the IRS's efforts promptly to collect taxes.
The decision is interlocutory because CA 2 remanded for
consideration of whether to order the Government to turn over the
property and for consideration of what protection to afford the
Government if turnover is required.

If the bankruptcy court reverses

its prior order to turn over the property, the issue could be avoided.
Given the bankruptcy court's clear desire to order the Government to
turn the property over, however, it appears unlikely that the issue
will go away.

The case--and resp's reorganization and the

Government's collection of taxes--would then be delayed for another
round of appeals.

Despite this case's interlocutory posture,

therefore, given the importance of the issue and the clear conflict,
the Court may wish to grant the petition.
6.

RECOMMENDATION:
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grant.

There is no response.
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Motion of the Parties to Dispense with
Printing the Joint Appendix

UNITED srATES

v.
vffiiTING POOLS, INC.
SUMMARY:

With consent of resp, the SG as petr seeks leave to dispense

with the printing of a joint appendix.
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS:

The question presented is whether a bankruptcy

court in a reorganization proceeding under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
may compel the government to turn over property to the debtor-in-r.:ossession,
where the government had seized the property by levy to satisfy the debtor's
delinquent federal tax liabilities prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petn.
Because the question presented is purely legal, the SG anticipates that
the Court will not need to consider any other portions of the record than the
opinions already appended to the cert petn.
DISCUSSION:
1/5/83

The motion should be granted.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 82-215:
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.
.From:

Mark

April 17, 1983

Questions Presented
Whether

a

bankruptcy court

in a

reorganization proceeding

under Chapter 11 may compel the Government to turn over property
to the trustee, where the Government had seized the property bv
levy prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition to satisfy
the debtor's delinquent federal tax liabilities.

2.

I. Background
On Jan. 14, 1981, the IRS seized all of resp Whiting Pools'
tangible

o.s.c.

property.

§6331.)

(The

IRS's

power

of

levv derives

from

26

The estimated value of the property as used by

resp as a going concern was $162,000; its value if sold was between $20,000-$35,000.

The IRS lien was for $92,000, plus inter-

est -- the amount of resp's unpaid withholding and FICA taxes.
The next day resp filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy

Code

and

was

continued

as

a

debtor

in

possession.

Onder the Code, the filing of a petition automatically stays disposition of the debtor's property.

§362.

The IRS filed an ac-

tion in bankruptcy court, seeking a ruling that would permit it
to sell the levied property.
the court

to order

trustee under §542.

the

Resp filed a counterclaim asking

IRS

to

turn over

the

property

stay would be continued;

if it did not,

if it did, the

there was no point in

continuing the stay.

court

~nkruptcy

(WDNY,

Pierce)

Elfin,

reversed,

the

Both parties agreed that the crucial issue

was whether the property had to be turned over:

The

to

,__-court
J.)

ordered

reversed.

reinstating

the

the

turnover;

the

district

z- (Friendly,

Then CA2
turnover

order.

Oakes,

This

Court

granted cert because of a conflict between CA2 and CA4.

There
broad,

are~o

question

II. Discussion
central issues

is~ether

in the case.

property

repossessed

The first, and
by

a

secured

creditor prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition is sub-

3.

ject to the Bankruptcy Code's turnover requirement.
property is exempt from turnover,

If all such

then it follows that property

subject to an IRS tax 1 ien also is not subject to turnover.
property in the possession of a
turnover,

then

I£

secured creditor is subject to

th ~nd qu~

must

be

reached:

whether

property seized under an IRS tax levy should be treated differently from property seized by ordinary secured creditors.
I

recommend affirmance of CA2.

I

think

that

repossessed

property held by secured creditors is subject to turnover.

--

The

second question is much closer, but I conclude that property lev-

-

ied by the IRS should not be treated differently

-

fro~ roperty

held as collateral by secured creditors.
A

Section 542 provides:
"§542. Turnover of property to the estate
(a} Except as provided in subsection (c) or
(d) of this section, an entity, other than a
custodian, in possession, custody, or control,
during the case, of property that the trustee
may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of
this title, or that the debtor may exempt
under section 552 of this title, shall deliver
to the trustee, and account for, such property
or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate."
The property that must be turned over is defined as the property
that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under §363.
provides that the trustee may use,

Section 363

sell, or lease "property of

the estate," §36 3 (b} , provided that other parties'

interests in

the property are given "adequate protection," §363(e}.

The key

phrase

in

is

"property of

the

estate,"

which

is

de£ ined

§5 41

4.

(a) (1) to mean "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property 7
The

f the commencement of the case."
Government's

principal

position

is

meaning" construction of these provisions:
turnover of "property of the estate."

based on

The property of the estate

the status of resp' s

in the

Under §6331 of

the delinquent taxpayer has only the

following limited rights in the seized property:
of the seizure and sale,

It therefore

interests

property as of the date the petition was filed.
the Internal Revenue Code,

"plain

Section 542 requires

is determined "as of the commencement of the case."
is necessary to analyze

a

right to notice

right to redeem prior to sale by full

payment of the taxes and the expenses of the levy, and right to
the surplus of proceeds from the sale.

Under §541, then, these

property interest belonged to the estate.

But the right to pos-

sess and use the property did not belong to resp as of the date
the petition was filed,

and therefore the property did not have

to be turned over.
CA2

conceded

that

the

Government's

argument

has

"some

force," but rejected it because of its broad implications.

Judge

Friendly noted that the Government's theory would apply as well
to a.!..l property

"repossess~ prior~ bankruptcv

itors or held by pledgees after a default."
Yet

in

Chapter ~--------------------10 reorganization

Bankruptcy Act,

by

secur~d

cred- (

r-

(Pet. App. at 13a.)

proceedings

under

the

prior

the bankruptcy court had power to order secured

creditors in possession to turn over their collateral.

Thus, the

reading urged by the Government would be a major change in the
law.

CA2

found no

indications that Congress

intended this re-

·.

5.

sult:

"[W]e do not believe that nearly 50 years of the law of

reorganization

would

have heen changed without

statement to that effect.
Government's

reading

then

found

would

that

seriously af feet

the chances of

(Id., at 16a.)

the legislative history strongly sup-

ported a broad reading of §542's turnover power.
witness testified

that

clear

This is particularly true because the

success in many reorganizations."
CA2

some

the

Witness after

bankruptcy court had

~

to be able to

order turnover of collateral of secured creditors in possession.
And it was shortly after this congressional testimony that §542
was added to the proposed legislation.

Finally, CA2 stated that

if the Government's argument is correct, §542's turnover authority amounts to very little:

"[A]pparently its only use would be

to authorize obtaining property from persons in wrongful possession following theft or conversion."
I

find

CA2's

argument

(Id., at 23a.).

persuasive,

particularly

the

point

that Congress should not be presumed silently to have eliminated
an important power of bankruptcy courts.
turnover

power

in

reorganization

The existence of this

proceedings

was

leading case being Reconstruction Finance Corp.
F.2d 791,

794

(CAl 1950):

rehabilitation

of

v.

settled,

the

Kaplan,

185

"In contrast with the provisions ~

law relating to straight bankruptcy,
the

financially

Chapter X ••• contemplates

ailing

business corporations

under plans of reorganization which may deal with claims of creditors, secured as well as unsecured, and embrace all of the debtor's property,
terests."

.

•'

~

however encumbered with outstanding security in-

In 1975 many witnesses testified as to the importance

6.

of this power, and the SG has cited none arguing that such a power was unwarranted or should be eliminated.
on the heels of this testimony.

Section 542 followed

Given this background, I cannot

believe that Congress intended to repeal this authority.

Under

the SG's view, which admittedly is supported by the literal terms
of the statute, the only things to be turned over are the particular limited interests (e.g., right to notice before a sale) the
debtor

retains

in encumbered property.

It makes little sense,

however, to talk of "turning over" such intangibles.

I therefore

would reject the SG's narrow definition of "property of the estate,"

and

-

hold

that

Congress

intended

§542

to authorize

the

turnover of tangible property still owned by the debtor but in
the possession of a secured creditor.
B

The

more

difficult

.
ques t 10n

~
1s

~
wh et h er

an

IRS

tax

levy

should be treated differently from the interests of secured credi tors

in possession.

The SG emphasizes

that

an

IRS

tax

levy

"virtually transfers ownership of seized property to the government," Brief at 25,

that "[t]here are sharp differences between

the consensual relationship of a private creditor and his debtor,
and the involuntary relationship of the government and a delinquent taxpayer," id., at 36, and that the .Federal Government has
more

extensive

creditors.
virtually

CA2,

remedies

for

collecting

on the other hand,

indistinguishable

from

debts

than

do

private

found that an IRS levy "is

the ordinary

repossession and

foreclosure procedures followed by secured creditors, except for
the fact that the IRS can make its own levy without need of the

l .. ~

~

7.

assistance of a sheriff/
I
right

agree with
of

CA2.

repossession,

"

(Pet. App. at 23a-24a.)

When a
he

secured creditor exercises his

obtains essentially

the

same

rights

over the property as does the IRS -- ownership may be "virtually
transferred"

from the debtor to the creditor.

And although the

SG is correct that tax liability to the IRS differs from a contractual liability to a creditor, I do not see why this difference should lead to a different turnover rule.

The peculiar in-

terests of the IRS appropriately may be considered by the trustee
in deciding what constitutes "adequate protection" of its interests under §3n3(e).

But I am not convinced that Congress would

want the IRS to be able to keep its levied property entirely out
of the reorganziation process when other secured creditors must
turn their repossessed property over to the trustee.
The SG relies heavily

on~lps

v.

United States, 421

u.s.

330 (1975), for the proposition that tax-levied property does not
have to be turned over.

In Phelps a delinquent taxpayer han as-

signed property to a third party, which had converted the property to cash.
funds

The IRS filed a notice of tax lien and levied on the

in the assignee's hands.

An involuntary bankruptcy peti-

tion subsequently was filed against the taxpayer, and the receiver

sought

to

force

the

assignee

to

turn over

the cash.

This

Court held that the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to
order the turnover.
gave the

u.s.

In so holding, the Court found that the levy

"full legal right" to the amount levied.

421

u.s.,

at 337.
The significance of this case is doubtful.

Certain language

8.

used by the Court suggests a view that mere notice of a tax levy
vests legal title in the United States, which might suggest that
IRS tax levies do differ from other rights of secured creditors.
But, as CA2 found, the particular holding in Phelps is not relevant,

because

summary

it dealt with

a

and plenary bankruptcy

now defunct

distinction between

~urisdiction.

The Court deter-

mined that the assignee was holding the funds for the Government,
and followed the rule that "where possession is assertedly held
not for the bankrupt but for others prior to bankruptcy .•. the
holder is not subject to summary jurisdiction."

Id., at 335-336.

It is significant that this rule apparently would apply as well
to property held for a private third party, i.e., a secured creditor.

Moreover, Phelps involved a liquidation bankruptcy, not a

reorganization proceeding -- and the turnover rule recognized in
cases such as RPC v.

Kaplan,

supra, was based expressly on the

particular need for turnover in reorganization cases.

In sum, I

do not think Phelps provides much support for the view that the
IRS is free from the turnover authority of a trustee in a reorganization proceeding.
I

should add that I

analysis.
Court

finds

am not entirely at rest on the above

The SG makes a reasonable argument that even if the
that Congress

intended to continue the preexisting

rule on turnovers by secured creditors in possession, there is no
reason to imply such a rule as to the IRS because there was no
clearly established prior rule to that effect.

But as of now I

am persuaded by CA2's analysis that the rule should encompass all
similar security interests.

9.

III. Conclusion
I recommend that CA2 be affirmed, on the same reasoning used
by CA2.

"Property of the estate"

subject to turnover

incluoes

property of the debtor that has been levied or repossessed.

'
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

8~215

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
WHITING POOLS, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[May-, 1983]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Promptly after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) seized respondent's property to satisfy a tax lien, respondent filed a petition for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, hereinafter referred to as the
"Bankruptcy Code." The issue before us is whether § 542(a)
of that Code authorized the Bankruptcy Court to subject the
IRS to a turnover order with respect to the seized property.
I

A
Respondent Whiting Pools, Inc., a corporation, sells, installs, and services swimming pools and related equipment
and supplies. As of January 1981, Whiting owed approximately $92,000 in Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes
and federal taxes withheld from its employees, but had failed
to respond to assessments and demands for payment by the
IRS. As a consequence, a tax lien in that amount attached
to all of Whiting's property.'
'Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 6321,
provides:
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States
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On January 14, 1981, the Service seized Whiting's tangible
personal property-equipment, vehicles, inventory, and office supplies-pursuant to the levy and distraint provision
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 2 According to
uncontroverted findings, the estimated liquidation value of
the property seized was, at most, $35,000, but its estimated
going-concern value in Whiting's hands was $162,876. The
very next day, January 15, Whiting filed a petition for reorganization, under the Bankruptcy Code's Chapter 11, 11
U. S. C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V), in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New
York. Whiting was continued as debtor-in-possession. 3
The United States, intending to proceed with a tax sale of
the property, 4 moved in the Bankruptcy Court for a declaration that the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy
Code, § 362(a), is inapplicable to the IRS or, in the alternaupon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
2
Section 6331 of that Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6331 provides:
"(a) Authority of Secretary
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary
to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the
expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property ...
belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter
for the payment of such tax. . . .
"(b) Seizure and sale of property
"The term 'levy' as used in this title includes the power of distraint and
seizure by any means. . . . In any case in which the Secretary may levy
upon property or rights to property, he may seize and sell such property or
rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or intangible)."
3
With certain exceptions not relevant here, a debtor-in-possession,
such as Whiting, performs the same functions as a trustee in a reorganization. 11 U. S. C. § 1107(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
• Section 6335, as amended, of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6335, provides for the sale of seized property after notice. The taxpayer is entitled
to any surplus of the proceeds of the sale. § 6342(b).
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tive, for relief from the stay. Whiting counterclaimed for an
order requiring the Service to turn the seized property over
to the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 Whiting intended to use the property in its
reorganized business.
B
The Bankruptcy Court determined that the IRS was bound
by the automatic stay provision. In re Whiting Pools, Inc.,
10 B. R. 755 (1981). Because it found that the seized property was essential to Whiting's reorganization effort, it refused to lift the stay. Acting under § 543(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 6 rather than under § 542(a), the court directed
the IRS to turn the property over to Whiting on the condition
that Whiting provide the Service with specified protection for
its interests. 10 B. R., at 760-761. 7
Section 542(a) provides in relevant part:
"[A]n entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or control,
during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under
section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 of
this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the
value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or
benefit to the estate." 11 U. S. C. § 542(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
6
Section 543(b)(1) requires a custodian to "deliver to the trustee any
property of the debtor transferred to such custodian, or proceeds of such
property, that is in such custodian's possession, custody, or control on the
date that such custodian acquires knowledge of the commencement of the
case."
The Bankruptcy Court declined to base the turnover order on § 542(a)
because it felt bound by In re Avery Health Center, Inc ., 8 B. R. 1016
(WDNY 1981) (§ 542(a) does not draw into debtor's estate property seized
by IRS prior to filing of petition).
7
Section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or
proposed to be used, sold, or leased by the trustee, the court shall prohibit
or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate
protection of such interest. In any hearing under this section, the trustee
5

•.
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The United States District Court reversed, holding that a
turnover order against the Service was not authorized by either§ 542(a) or§ 543(b)(1). App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
turn, reversed the District Court. 674 F. 2d 144 (1982). It
held that a turnover order could issue against the Service
under § 542(a), and it remanded the case for reconsideration
of the adequacy of Bankruptcy Court's protection conditions.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its ruling was contrary to that reached by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Cross Electric Co. v. United States,
664 F. 2d 1218 (1981), and noted confusion on the issue among
bankruptcy and district courts. 674 F. 2d, at 145 and n. 1.
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict in an important
area of the law under the new Bankruptcy Code. 459 U. S.
(1982).
II
By virtue of its tax lien, the Service holds a secured interest in Whiting's property. We first examine whether
§ 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code generally authorizes the
turnover of property of a debtor seized by a secured creditor
prior to the commencement of reorganization proceedings.
Section 542(a) requires an entity in possession of "property
that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under § 363" to deliver
that property to the trustee. Subsections (b) and (c) of§ 363
authorize the trustee to use, sell, or lease any "property of
the estate," subject to certain conditions for the protection of
has the burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection." 11 U. S. C.
§ 363(e) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
Pursuant to this section, the Bankruptcy Court set the following conditions
to protect the tax lien: Whiting was to pay the Service $20,000 before the
turnover occurred; Whiting also was to pay $1,000 a month until the taxes
were satisfied; the IRS was to retain its lien during this period; and if
Whiting failed to make the payments, the stay was to be lifted. 10 B. R.,
at 761.
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creditors with an interest in the property. Section 541(a)(l)
defines the "estate" as "comprised of all the following property, wherever located: (1) ... all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case." Although these statutes could be read to limit the estate to those "interests of the debtor in property" at the time
of the filing of the petition, we view them as a definition of
what is included in the estate, rather than as a limitation.
A

In proceedings under the reorganization provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, a troubled enterprise may be restructured
to enable it to operate successfully in the future. Until the
business can be reorganized pursuant to a plan under 11
U. S. C. §§ 1121-1129 (1976 ed., Supp. V), the trustee or
debtor-in-possession is authorized to manage the property of
the estate and to continue the operation of the business. See
§ 1108. By permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated
that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy
creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 220 (1977). Congress presumed
that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used
in a rehabilitated business than if "sold for scrap." Ibid.
The reorganization effort would have small chance of success,
however, if property essential to running the business were
excluded from the estate. See 6 J. Moore & L. King, Collier
on Bankruptcy~ 3.05, p. 431 (14th ed. 1978). Thus, to facilitate the rehabilitation of the debtor's business, all the debtor's property must be included in the reorganization estate.
This authorization extends even to property of the estate
in which a creditor has a secured interest. § 363(b) and (c);
see H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 182 (1977). Although Congress might have safeguarded the interests of secured creditors outright by excluding from the estate any property subject to a secured interest, it chose instead to include such
property in the estate and to provide secured creditors with
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"adequate protection" for their interests. § 363(e), quoted in
n. 7, supra. At the secured creditor's insistence, the bankruptcy court must place such limits or conditions on the trustee's power to sell, use, or lease property as are necessary
to protect the creditor. The creditor with a secured interest
in property included in the estate must look to this provision
for protection, rather than to the nonbankruptcy remedy of
possession.
Both the congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations
and Congress' choice of methods to protect secured creditors
suggest that Congress intended a broad range of property to
be included in the estate.
B

The statutory language reflects this view of the scope of
the estate. As noted above, § 541(a) provides that the "estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located: . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U. S. C.
§ 541(a)(l). 8 The House and Senate Reports on the Bank8

Section 541(a)(1) speaks in terms of the debtor's "interests ... in property," rather than property in which the debtor has an interest, but this
choice of language was not meant to limit the expansive scope of the section. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to exclude
from the estate property of others in which the debtor had some minor interest such as a lien or bare legal title. See 124 Cong. Rec. 32399, 32417
(1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); id., at 33999, 34016-34017 (remarks of
Sen. DeConcini); cf. § 541(d) (property in which debtor holds legal but not
equitable title, such as a mortgage in which debtor retained legal title to
service or to supervise servicing of mortgage, becomes part of estate only
to extent of legal title); 124 Cong. Rec. 33999 (1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini) (§ 541(d) "reiterates the general principle that where the debtor
holds bare legal title without any equitable interest, . . . the estate acquires bare legal title without any equitable interest in the property'').
Similar statements to the effect that § 541(a)(1) does not expand the rights
of the debtor in the hands of the estate were made in the context of describing the principle that the estate succeeds to no more or greater causes of
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ruptcy Code indicate that § 541(a)(l)'s scope is broad. 9 Most
important, in the context of this case, § 541(a)(l) is intended
to include in the estate any property made available to the
estate by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See
H. R. Rep. No. 95--595, p. 367 (1977). Several of these provisions bring into the estate property in which the debtor did
not have a possessory interest at the time the bankruptcy
proceedings commenced. 10
Section 542(a) is such a provision. It requires an entity
(other than a custodian) holding any property of the debtor
that the trustee can use under § 363 to turn that property
over to the trustee. 11 Given the broad scope of the reorga. action against third parties than those held by the debtor. See H. R. Rep.
No. 95--595, pp. 367-368 (1977). These statements do not limit the ability
of a trustee to regain possession of property in which the debtor had equitable as well as legal title.
9
"The scope of this paragraph [§ 541(a)(l)] is broad. It includes all
kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, causes of action (see Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6)), and all other forms of property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act." H. R. Rep. No.
95--595, p. 367 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 82 (1978).
10
See, e. g., §§543, 547, and 548. These sections permit the trustee to
demand the turnover of property that is in the possession of others if that
possession is due to a custodial arrangement, § 543, to a preferential transfer, § 547, or to a fraudulent transfer, § 548.
We do not now decide the outer boundaries of the bankruptcy estate.
We note only that Congress plainly excluded property of others held by the
debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the petition. See § 541(b); H. R.
Rep. No. 95--595, p. 368 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 82 (1978). Although it may well be that funds that the IRS can demonstrate were withheld for its benefit pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7501 (employee withholding
taxes), are excludable from the estate, see 124 Cong. Rec. 32417 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (Service may exclude funds it can trace), the IRS
did not attempt to trace the withheld taxes in this case. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 18, 28-29.
11
The House Report expressly includes property of the debtor recovered
under § 542(a) in the estate: the estate includes "property recovered by the
trustee under section 542 . . . , if the property recovered was merely out
of the possession of the debtor, yet remained 'property of the debtor."'
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nization estate, property of the debtor repossessed by a secured creditor falls within this rule, and therefore may be
drawn into the estate. While there are explicit limitations
on the reach of§ 542(a), 12 none requires that the debtor hold a
possessory interest in the property at the commencement of
the reorganization proceedings. 18
As does all bankruptcy law, § 542(a) modifies the procedural rights available to creditors to protect and satisfy their
liens. 14 See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311
H. R. Rep. No. 95--595, p. 367 (1977); see 4 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy
11541.16, p. 541-72.10 (15th ed. 1982).
12
Section 542 provides that the property be usable under § 363, and that
turnover is not required in three situations: when the property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate, § 542(a), when the holder of the
property has transferred it in good faith without knowledge of the petition,
§ 542(c), or when the transfer of the property is automatic to pay a life insurance premium, § 542(d).
18
Under the old Bankruptcy Act, a bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction over a debtor's property was limited to property in the debtor's possession when the liquidation petition was filed. Phelps v. United States,
421 U. S. 330, 335-336 (1975); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264
U. S. 426, 432-434 (1924). Phelps, which involved a liquidation under the
prior Bankruptcy Act, held that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to
direct the Service to turn over property which had been levied on and
which, at the time of the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, was in
the possession of an assignee of the debtor's creditors.
Phelps does not control this case. First, the new Bankruptcy Code
abolished the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction, thus
expanding the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts beyond the possession limitation. H. R. Rep. No. 95--595, pp. 48-49 (1977); see Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982)
(plurality opinion) (slip op. 3). Moreover, Phelps was a liquidation situation, and is inapplicable to reorganization proceedings such as we consider
here.
14
One of the procedural rights the law of secured transactions grants a
secured creditor to enforce its lien is the right to take possession of the
secured property upon the debtor's default. Uniform Commercial Code
§ 9--503, 3A U. L. A. 211 (1981). A creditor's possessory interest resulting
from the exercise of this right is subject to certain restrictions on the credi-
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U. S. 273, 278-279 (1940). See generally Nowak, Turnover
Following Prepetition Levy of Distraint Under Bankruptcy
Code § 542, 55 Am. Bankr. L. J. 313, 332--333 (1981). In effect, § 542(a) grants to the estate a possessory interest in certain property of the debtor that was not held by the debtor at
the commencement of reorganization proceedings. 16 The
Bankruptcy Code provides secured creditors various rights,
including the right to adequate protection, and these rights
•
replace the protection afforded by possession.

c
This interpretation of § 542(a) is supported by the section's
legislative history. Although the legislative reports are
silent on the precise issue before us, the House and Senate
hearings from which § 542(a) emerged provide guidance.
Several witnesses at those hearings noted, without contradiction, the need for a provision authorizing the turnover of
property of the debtor in the possession of secured creditor's use of the property. See§ 9--504, 3A U. L.A. 256-257. Here, we
address the abrogation of the Service's possessory interest obtained pursuant to its tax lien, a secured interest. We do not decide whether any property of the debtor in which a third party holds a possessory interest independent of a creditor's remedies is subject to turnover under § 542(a). For
example, if property is pledged to the secured creditor so that the creditor
has possession prior to any default, 542(a) may not require turnover. See
4 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy~ 541.08[9], p. 541-53 (15th ed. 1982).
16
Indeed, if this were not the effect, § 542(a) would be largely superfluous in light of § 541(a)(l). Interests in the seized property that could have
been exercised by the debtor-in this case, the rights to notice and the surplus from a tax sale, see n. 4, supra-are already part of the estate by virtue of§ 541(a)(l). No coercive power is needed for this inclusion. The
fact that § 542(a) grants the trustee greater rights than those held by the
debtor prior to the filing of the petition is consistent with other provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code that address the scope of the estate. See, e. g.,
§ 544 (trustee has rights of lien creditor); § 545 (trustee has power to avoid
statutory liens); § 549 (trustee has power to avoid certain post-petition
transactions).
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tors. 16 Section 542(a) first appeared in the proposed legislation shortly after these hearings. See H. R. 6, § 542(a), 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., introduced January 4, 1977. See generally
Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54
Am. Bankr. L. J. 275, 27~281 (1980). The section remained
unchanged through subsequent versions of the legislation.
Moreover, this interpretation of § 542 in the reorganization
context is consistent with judicial precedent predating the
Bankruptcy Code. Under Chapter X, the reorganization
chapter of the Bankruptcy Act of 1878, as amended,
§§ 101-276, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (formerly codified as 11
U. S.C §§5014>76 (1976 ed.)), the bankruptcy court could
order the turnover of collateral in the hands of a secured
_creditor. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 F.
2d 791, 796 (CA11950); see In re Third Ave. Transit Corp.,
198 F. 2d 703, 706 (CA2 1952); 6A J. Moore & L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy~ 14.03, p. 741-742 (14th ed. 1977); Murphy, Use of Collateral in Business Rehabilitations: A Suggested Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 1483, 1492-1495 (1975).
Nothing in the legislative history evinces a congressional intent to depart from that practice. Any other interpretation
of § 542(a) would deprive the bankruptcy estate of the assets
and property essential to its rehabilitation effort and thereby
would frustrate the congressional purpose behind the reorganization provisions. 17
See Hearings on H. R. 31 and H. R. 32 Before the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., 439 (1975) (statement of Patrick A. Murphy); id., at
1023 (statement of Walter W. Vaughn); id., at 1757 (statement of Robert J.
Grimmig); id., at 1823-1839 (remarks and statement of Leon S. Forman,
National Bankruptcy Conference); Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before
the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 (1975) (statement of
William W. Vaughn); id., at 464 (statement of Robert J. Grimmig). In
general, we find Judge Friendly's careful analysis of this history for the
Court of Appeals, 674 F. 2d, at 152-156, to be unassailable.
17
Section 542(a) also governs turnovers in liquidation and individual
16
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We conclude that the reorganization estate includes property of the debtor that has been seized by a creditor prior to
the filing of a petition for reorganization.

III
A

We see no reason why a different result should obtain
when the IRS is the creditor. The Service is bound by
§ 542(a) to the same extent as any other secured creditor.
The Bankruptcy Code expressly states that the term "entity," used in § 542(a), includes a governmental unit.
§ 101(14). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Moreover, Congress
carefully considered the effect of the new Bankruptcy Code
on tax collection, see generally S. Rep. No. 95--1106 (1978)
(report of Senate Finance Committee), and decided to provide protection to tax collectors, such as the IRS, through
grants of enhanced priorities for unsecured tax claims,
§ 507(a)(6), and by the nondischarge of tax liabilities,
§ 523(a)(1). S. Rep. No. 95--989, pp. 14-15 (1978). Tax collectors also enjoy the generally applicable right under
§ 363(e) to adequate protection for property subject to their
liens. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended a special exception for
the tax collector in the form of an exclusion from the estate of
property seized to satisfy a tax lien.
B

Of course, if a tax levy or seizure transfers to the IRS ownership of the property seized, § 542(a) may not apply. The
enforcement provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of
adjustment of debt proceedings under Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U. S. C. §§ 701-766, 1301-1330 (1976 ed., Supp. V). See
§ 103(a).
Our analysis in this case depends in part on the reorganization
context in which the turnover order is sought. We express no view on the
issue whether § 542(a) has the same broad effect in liquidation or adjustment of debt proceedings.
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1954, 26 U. S. C. §§ 6321-6326 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), do
grant to the Service powers to enforce its tax liens that are
greater than those possessed by private secured creditors
under state law. See United States v. Rodgers,-- U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (slip op. 4); id., at--,--, n. 7 (dissenting opinion) (slip op. 1, 6, n. 7); United States v. Bess, 357
U. S. 51, 56-57 (1958). But those provisions do not transfer
ownership of the property to the IRS. 18
18

It could be argued that dictum in Phelps v. United States, 421 U. S.
330 (1975), suggests the contrary. In that case, the IRS had levied on a
fund held by an assignee of the debtor for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. In a liquidation proceeding under the old Bankruptcy Act, the
trustee sought an order directing the assignee to turn the funds over to the
estate. The Court determined that the levy transferred constructive possession of the fund to the Service, thus ousting the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction. 421 U. S., at 335--336. In rebutting the trustee's argument
that actual possession by the IRS was necessary to avoid jurisdiction, the
Court stated: "The levy ... gave the United States full legal right to the
$38,000 levied upon as against the claim of the petitioner receiver." /d., at
337. This sentence, however, is merely a restatement of the proposition
that the levy gave the Service a sufficient possessory interest to avoid the
bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction. The proposition is now irrelevant because of the expanded jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts under the
Bankruptcy Code. See n. 13, supra.
The Court in Phelps made a similar statement in discussing the trustee's
claim that § 70a(8) of the old Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 110(a)(8) (1976
ed.) (trustee is vested "with the title of the debtor as of the date of the
filing of the petition . . . to . . . property held by an assignee for the benefit
of creditors"), continued constructive possession of the property in the estate, notwithstanding the pre-petition levy. 421 U. S., at 337, n. 8. The
Court rejected this claim. It first cited the trustee's concession that the
debtor had surrendered title upon conveying the property to the assignee,
ibid., and held that, because the debtor did not hold title to the property as
of the date of filing, the property was not covered by § 70a(8). The Court
went on, however, to state that "the pre-bankruptcy levy displaced any
title of [the debtor] and § 70a(8) is therefore inapplicable." Ibid. Because
the initial conveyance of the property to the assignee was said to have
extinguished the debtor's claim, this latter statement was unnecessary to
the decision. To the extent, if any, that it conflicts with our decision here,
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The Service's interest in seized property is its lien on that
property. The Internal Revenue Code's levy and seizure
provisions, 26 U. S. C. §§6331 and 6332, are special procedural devices available to the IRS to protect and satisfy its
liens, United States v. Sullivan, 333 F. 2d 100, 116 (CA3
1964), and are analogous to the remedies available to private
secured creditors. See Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503,
3A U. L. A. 211-212 (1981); n. 14, supra. They are provisional remedies that do not determine the Service's rights to
the seized property, but merely bring the property into the
Service's legal custody. See 4 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation
of Income, Estates and Gifts ~ 111.5.5, p. 111-108 (1981).
See generally Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, pt. 1, 13 Tax L. Rev. 247, 272 (1958). At no point does
the Service's interest in the property exceed the value of the
lien. United States v. Rodgers, --U.S., a t - - , - (slip op. 12); id., at-- (dissenting opinion) (slip op. 12); see
United States v. Sullivan, 333 F. 2d, at 116 ("the Commissioner acts pursuant to the collection process in the capacity
of lienor as distinguished from owner"). The IRS is obligated to return to the debtor any surplus from a sale. 26
U. S. C. § 6342(b). Ownership of the property is transferred only when the property is sold to a bona fide purchaser
at a tax sale. See Bennett v. Hunter, 9 Wall. 326, 336 (1870);
26 U.S. C. §6339(a)(2); Plumb, 13 Tax. L. Rev., at 274-275.
In fact, the tax sale provision itself refers to the debtor as
the owner of the property after the seizure but prior to the
sale. 19 Until such a sale takes place, the property remains
the debtor's and thus is subject to the turnover requirement
of§ 542(a).
we depart from it.
19
See 26 U. S. C. § 6335(a) ("As soon as practicable after seizure of property, notice in writing shall be given by the Secretary to the owner of the
property"), and § 6335(b) ("The Secretary shall as soon as practicable after
the seizure of the property give notice to the owner").
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IV
When property seized prior to the filing of a petition is
drawn into the Chapter 11 reorganization estate, the Service's tax lien is not dissolved; nor is its status as a secured
creditor destroyed. The IRS, under § 363(e), remains entitled to adequate protection for its interests, to other rights
enjoyed by secured creditors, and to the specific privileges
accorded tax collectors. Section 542(a) simply requires the
Service to seek protection of its interest according to the congressionally established bankruptcy procedures, rather than
by withholding the seized property from the debtor's efforts
to reorganize.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered .
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